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QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF FOREIGN NATIONS
Donald Earl Childress III*
INTRODUCTION
In The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,1
Professor Ingrid Wuerth boldly goes where few U.S. federal courts and
scholars have gone before to advance a reading of the U.S. Constitution that
provides constitutional protections for foreign nations when they are sued in
U.S. federal courts. As she explains, treating foreign states and some foreignstate owned enterprises under current U.S. federal case law as categorically
outside the Constitution, with their capacity to be sued governed by a
statute—the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)2—while treating
foreign individuals, foreign corporations, and some foreign-state related
corporate entities as enjoying full constitutional protections is logically
inconsistent. In responding to this purported doctrinal incoherence,
Professor Wuerth argues that the better reading of the law is that Article III
of the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment, and separation of powers
principles protect foreign states and some foreign-state enterprises just as
these provisions and doctrines protect foreign individuals when they are sued
in U.S. federal courts.
In Professor Wuerth’s reading of the Constitution, because Article III vests
and extends to U.S. federal courts original jurisdiction over suits “between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects,”3
denying foreign nations personal jurisdiction and notice is contrary to the
“purpose” of Article III as understood during the founding era (which is to
protect foreign nations from unfair proceedings and to prevent international
discord).4 As Wuerth puts it, “[h]aving created a federal forum for this
purpose, it would be odd for those who enacted the Constitution to provide
structural disadvantages to foreign sovereigns by creating litigation-related
constitutional rights that benefitted only private parties.”5

* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. (2012).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 661.
5. Id.
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The Constitution’s vesting of “[t]he judicial Power of the United States”
in Article III “in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”6 in Professor
Wuerth’s reading, suggests a connection to personal jurisdiction and notice
that protects foreign sovereigns in similar ways as private parties. As she
develops the argument, the idea is that the exercise of Article III’s “judicial
power” necessarily depends on the parties, even foreign sovereign parties,
being properly before a U.S. federal court. This requires a federal court to
have personal jurisdiction because “subject matter jurisdiction is limited by
personal jurisdiction.”7 In her view, the prevailing understanding that
foreign nations are not protected by the Constitution disadvantages foreign
states by granting them fewer protections than private litigants, and
“[d]isadvantaging foreign sovereigns in this way seems contrary to the
purpose of Article III during the founding period.”8 Furthermore, she argues
that the federal judicial power requires notice as a condition for its exercise
under Article III because, in her reading of the historical sources, notice is
linked to the exercise of judicial power and “suggest[s] that the exercise of
judicial power presupposed notice.”9 She maintains that Article III’s vesting
and extension of the federal judicial power on U.S. federal courts to cover
certain cases involving foreign states necessarily requires personal
jurisdiction and notice to all defendants, even foreign sovereigns.10
Professor Wuerth extends this line of argument to the Fifth Amendment.
Because the Fifth Amendment protects a “person” from deprivations of
“property” without “due process of law,”11 she argues that the process due in
federal court included certain process even as to foreign nations.12 She
maintains that the process protections of the Fifth Amendment extended to
foreign states as such states would have been understood as “persons” under
the Fifth Amendment at the time of the founding.13 As she concludes, “[o]n
textual and historical grounds, application of Fifth Amendment due process
protections to foreign states is straightforward.”14
Next, Professor Wuerth claims that separation of powers principles compel
a similar conclusion. As she explains, “[s]eparation of powers principles
were understood to protect entities other than individual ‘persons.’”15 In her
view, “[t]here is no textual basis for concluding that foreign states” are not
protected “by other separation of powers protections.”16

6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
7. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 664.
8. See id. at 661.
9. See id. at 668.
10. See id. at 676.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 676.
13. Id. at 678.
14. Id. at 679.
15. Id. at 680.
16. Id.
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Based on this analysis, Professor Wuerth concludes that foreign nations
have Article III and due process rights and that they are protected by
separation of powers principles.17 She thus asserts that the analysis of the
constitutional rights of foreign nations “should reject general theories of
constitutional exclusion and inclusion” and instead “should take a right-byright approach, and should generally provide to foreign states the same
litigation-related rights that other defendants enjoy.”18 She contends that
foreign sovereigns are due certain process, which means a “territorially
restricted power to compel attendance before the court” that duplicates
“protections already provided to all defendants through separation of
powers.”19
As Professor Wuerth recognizes, such a reading of the Constitution is not
supported by current Supreme Court case law, most lower court case law, or
the scholarly conventional wisdom, although she does note that it is
supported by some lower court case law pre-dating the FSIA.20
Professor Wuerth’s analysis is not only novel but also potentially
groundbreaking, if correct. It opens up new lines of argument for foreign
sovereigns and foreign-state entities appearing before U.S. federal courts and
challenges the foundation for the treatment of foreign sovereigns and their
entities by federal courts. Indeed, Professor Wuerth’s argument might call
into question parts of the FSIA.
This response evaluates whether Professor Wuerth’s reading of the
Constitution is correct. In so doing, this response considers the original
understanding of these provisions, the law of nations as understood during
the founding era, and Supreme Court case law close to the time of the
founding. As explained below, I conclude that it is questionable that the
Constitution extends rights to foreign nations.
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
In what follows, I examine Professor Wuerth’s claim that Article III and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provide rights and
protections for foreign states when they are sued in a U.S. federal court.21
Based on my review of the text of these provisions, as well as the best
founding-era picture we can construct from early Supreme Court case law
and the understanding of the law of nations at that time, it is questionable that
the Constitution grants constitutional rights to foreign states.

17. Id. at 686.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 690.
20. See id. at 640–53.
21. Professor Wuerth goes on to consider the relationship between due process and
separation of powers. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 679. Because she concludes that there is
an overlap and duplication between these doctrines as well as Article III, the analysis in this
response calls into question whether separation of powers principles are engaged in the case
of foreign states even though I do not directly consider her arguments based on separation of
powers principles.
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A. Article III
According to Professor Wuerth, because Article III vests U.S. federal
courts with original jurisdiction and extends that jurisdiction to cases (and
controversies) involving foreign states, this vesting (and extension) of the
federal judicial power confers a benefit or right upon foreign states.22 It also
suggests, in her telling, that the “vesting of ‘judicial power’ itself . . . also
brings with it personal jurisdiction-based limitations”23 in cases involving
foreign states because “Article III already required personal jurisdiction and
notice.”24
While this is a novel claim, this is not, in my view, the best reading of the
Constitution, especially in light of the Constitution’s text and background
principles of law at the time of the founding. Rather, the law of nations and
Supreme Court case law immediately after the founding provide little support
for this conclusion and instead point to the conclusion that foreign states were
only entitled to whatever rights the United States as a sovereign granted them
in its sole discretion.
As to the text, Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power” in
“one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”25 Article III goes on to establish that the
federal government’s “judicial Power shall extend” to various categories of
“Cases” and “Controversies,” including “Controversies . . . between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”26 Sections
2 and 3 of Article III do not define what the “judicial Power” means. Section
2 merely describes the categories of cases where U.S. federal courts may
exercise their judicial power whatever that may be. Section 3 takes up the
distinct question of treason.
A plain reading of Article III reveals no affirmative grant of any right to
foreign states, or, indeed, an affirmative grant of any right to any other party
that may appear before a federal court exercising the federal “judicial
Power.” Article III simply provides that federal courts have the “judicial
Power” to hear certain cases—what we would call today subject matter
jurisdiction—involving “foreign States” when a suit is brought by or against
them and a “State, or the Citizens thereof” is opposite them. Article III thus
provides jurisdiction for a federal tribunal to hear a case or controversy
involving a foreign state in certain circumstances. It does nothing more.
Article III does not tell U.S. federal courts what to do with those cases when
they are brought. For instance, Article III does not tell U.S. federal courts
what notice is due, what process is due, or what rules of decision should be
employed by the federal court in considering the case at bar.
Article III’s silence on rules of decision is unsurprising because the
unamended Constitution primarily addresses the structural organization of
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 664–65.
Id.
Id. at 669.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
Id.
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the federal government. The discussion of a party’s rights largely appears in
the amendments to the Constitution. While there are some passages—such
as Article III, Section 2’s guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases—that do
speak in terms of what we might today call “rights,” all this proves is that
“even before the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights, the framers
knew how to draft the Constitution in terms of personal rights.”27 The fact
that the framers decided not to draft Article III to provide rights to foreign
states, especially in light of the contrasting jury trial language in Article III,
Section 2, strongly suggests that the text of Article III was not intended to
confer any rights on foreign states.28
Recognizing that the text of Article III alone does not support her
argument, Professor Wuerth details some statements from the founding era
that, in her view, illustrate the “purpose” that Article III’s foreign state
provisions were drafted in part to protect foreign sovereigns, and that foreign
sovereigns would be granted personal jurisdiction and notice protections to
protect them.29 Notwithstanding her gloss on the founding-era history, I am
aware of no direct evidence (and she provides none) of anyone around the
time of the founding suggesting that Article III was drafted to confer a right
on a foreign state.
Professor Wuerth also argues that the case or controversy language in
Article III imports into that article requirements of personal jurisdiction and
notice.30 In so claiming, she relies on a certain background understanding of
what the case and controversy words in Article III meant. The understanding
of these words is contested, as scholarly commentary shows.31 The
“consensus hold[ing is] that the two words reflect the difference between
civil and criminal matters: the Constitution uses ‘Cases’ to include both sorts
of proceedings, while it uses ‘Controversies’ to refer specifically to civil
proceedings.”32 Regardless of what these words meant, and I take no
position on this important question here, these words do not clearly import
rights for foreign states into Article III. Article III defined and limited the
judicial power that was vested in the federal courts; it did not speak to the
rules that should be employed to resolve cases brought in federal courts.
There certainly were background principles at the time of the founding that
would inform a federal court’s analysis of the Constitution’s text and a
federal court’s approach to the rule of decision that should apply in a case
involving a foreign state. These background principles have been described
as “general law.” This includes common law and the law of nations.33 The
27. Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2008).
28. See id.
29. Wuerth, supra note 1, at Part II.A.3.
30. See id. at 668–69.
31. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the
Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994).
32. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1585–86 (2002).
33. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
503 (2006).
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law of nations was the “default source of rules of decision for federal courts
to apply in cases and controversies before them”34 involving foreign states.
The better reading of the sources, in my view, is that these principles
informed judge-made, common law rules and did not create constitutional
rights for foreign states. So, rather than focusing on the Constitution for the
rights of foreign states, as Professor Wuerth does, we need to look closely at
the law of nations to determine what rights were due to a foreign nation.
At the time of the founding, a nation’s jurisdiction or power to declare law
was viewed under the law of nations as an outgrowth of its sovereignty. As
explained by Emer de Vattel in his treatise, The Law of Nations,35 which was
the most well-known work on the subject in America at the time of the
founding,36 all recognized sovereign nations enjoyed certain “rights” under
the law of nations. Yet, “[o]f all the rights that can belong to a nation,
sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which others ought the
most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury.”37 As such,
no “foreign power [may] take cognisance of the administration of that
sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to
alter it.”38 From this principle of sovereignty, Vattel derived the idea that a
sovereign’s control over its territory conferred absolute jurisdiction and
power to declare law within that territory. In Vattel’s words, “[t]he empire
united to the domain, establishes the jurisdiction of the nation in its
territories, or the country that belongs to it.”39 One nation should not usurp
“the territory of another,” according to Vattel, and it “should also respect it,
and abstain from every act contrary to the rights of sovereigns: for a foreign
nation can claim no right to it.”40
Vattel spoke in the language of rights, but these were not constitutional
rights. Rather, they were rules of decision derived from the law of nations
that were to be applied by federal courts because the Constitution was silent
on them. These background principles, which were known at the time of the
founding, did not constitutionalize certain rights for foreign states. Instead,
they left the rules of decision a federal court should apply in a case involving
a foreign sovereign subject to judicial interpretation as part of the common
law process. A federal court would be expected to consult the law of nations
at the time of the founding to determine the rule of decision in a case
involving a foreign sovereign. The law of nations left significant room for a
nation and its courts to depart from Vattel’s understanding. At the time of
the founding, a nation could choose to grant a foreign state immunity in its
courts, but this was not done as a matter of legal obligation.
34. Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707,
1709 (2018).
35. 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Newberry et al. 1759).
36. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 749 (2012).
37. VATTEL, supra note 35, bk. II, § 54, at 138.
38. Id. § 55, at 138.
39. Id. § 84, at 147.
40. Id. § 93, at 151.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon41
illustrates the idea. In that case, the Court considered a case brought by
citizens of Maryland, claiming ownership in a ship that they argued had been
unlawfully taken from them by French agents on the high seas.42 When the
ship, which was sailing as a public vessel of France, docked at Philadelphia,
the claimants filed a libel, asking a federal court to attach the ship.43 In an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court, in considering whether the
federal courts had jurisdiction over a claim against a friendly foreign military
vessel that took refuge during a storm in an American port, held that the libel
should be dismissed.44
In so holding, it is telling that the Supreme Court does not begin its analysis
with the Constitution or even consider at any point in its analysis any
provision of the Constitution in resolving the question presented. In fact,
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the lower court had jurisdiction over
the Schooner Exchange without citing any constitutional provision at all.45
Article III and the Constitution had nothing to say, according to Chief Justice
Marshall, in resolving the question. Chief Justice Marshall thus looked
outside the Constitution—to the law of nations—as a rule of decision to
answer the question. And, in so doing, the Court tells us that it did not think
the Constitution itself spoke to the matter. This strongly calls into question
Professor Wuerth’s conclusion that Article III had inherent in it certain ideas
of a foreign state’s rights. Rather, the question of the amenability of a foreign
nation to suit in a U.S. federal court was not a question that Article III, due
process, or personal jurisdiction resolves, but rather was a question of
sovereignty as informed by the law of nations as applied by U.S. federal
courts.
In concluding, in The Schooner Exchange, that there was immunity from
suit, Chief Justice Marshall relied on the “principle of public [international]
law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for
their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power
from its jurisdiction.”46 As he explained, immunity for foreign warships in
the United States could not derive its “validity from an external source”
because “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.”47 Chief Justice Marshall went on to explain that
“[t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of
every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power,
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights

41. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
42. Id. at 117.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 137.
45. See id. at 133. The litigants also thought the Constitution was not engaged by the
question presented. As the U.S. Attorney General argued, “[t]he constitution of the United
States decides nothing—it only provides a tribunal, if a case can possibility exist.” Id.
46. Id. at 145–46.
47. Id.
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as its object.”48 Immunity from suit “must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself” in conformity with “those principles of national and municipal
law by which it ought to be regulated.”49 The rule of decision is not,
therefore, part of or derived from the Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall then went on to observe that the United States’
consent to provide immunity could be inferred from the practice of nations
toward foreign warships—an “implication” that only “the sovereign power
of the nation” could destroy.50 On this point, Chief Justice Marshall was
unconditionally clear: “[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the place [where
suit is brought] is capable of destroying” the immunity suggested “by the law
of nations.”51 A nation “may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by
employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals.”52
As understood by the Court, the basic principle does not appear to be that
foreign nations have rights under the Constitution or indeed any rights under
the law of nations. Instead, the idea was that the sovereign of the place where
suit is brought had full jurisdiction within its territory, and it was free to offer
immunity (or not) from suit through the express or implied waiver of its
jurisdiction.53 It was also free to withdraw such immunity in its discretion.
Such immunity is not, in other words, conveyed by Article III. It is derived
from the law of nations and may be rejected by the nation where suit is
brought.
The Schooner Exchange also points to another conclusion: foreign
sovereign immunity is not a right protected by the Constitution. Rather, it is
more akin to a privilege conveyed by the forum nation that might be
withdrawn by a nation where the suit is brought if that was perceived to be
in the forum sovereign’s interest. Thus, because a foreign sovereign’s
immunity from suit is not a constitutional command, it can be rejected by
legislation or judicial decision in the courts of the forum nation where suit is
brought.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange was not the
only evidence of this approach that Professor Wuerth refers to as the “rights”
of foreign states. Justice Joseph Story confirmed this understanding in the
1822 case of The Santissima Trinidad.54 In reviewing the Court’s decision
in The Schooner Exchange, Justice Story explained that the rule announced
in that case was not founded upon any notion that a foreign sovereign had an
absolute right, in virtue of its sovereignty, to an exemption of its property
from the local jurisdiction of another sovereign, when it came within its
territory; “for that would be to give [the foreign sovereign] sovereign power

48. Id. at 136–37.
49. Id. at 135–36
50. Id. at 146.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Accord H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,
28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 229 (1951).
54. 20 U.S. 283 (1822).
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beyond the limits of his own empire.”55 Rather, the rule “stands upon
principles of comity and convenience, and arises from the presumed consent
or license of nations.”56
Because such “consent and license is implied only from the general usage
of nations, it may be withdrawn upon notice at any time, without just offence”
by the forum sovereign or its courts.57 Taking Justice Story’s interpretation
of The Schooner Exchange decision at face value, this does not sound like a
right embedded in the Constitution.
Justice Story’s interpretation of the Court’s decision in The Schooner
Exchange and articulation of the rule in The Santissima Trinidad confirms
that the Constitution itself does not dictate the result when a foreign
sovereign is sued in a U.S. federal court, nor does the law of nations. A U.S.
federal court would, to be sure, apply the Constitution’s vesting and
extension of the judicial power in Article III to U.S. federal courts in light of
the law of nations, but U.S. federal courts would still be required to follow
the rules of comity and convenience announced by the United States as a
sovereign in resolving a given case. To the extent that the United States did
not wish to grant a foreign state immunity, personal jurisdiction, or notice,
that would be the end of the matter. Of course, such a decision by the political
branches might create international discord, but that would be up to the
political branches, as opposed to U.S. federal courts, to resolve.
This understating of the law of nations immediately after the founding
strongly supports the conclusion that foreign states were not granted any
rights by the Constitution, except to the extent that the United States wished
to afford a foreign state such rights under the law of nations in its discretion.
And, in so doing, a U.S. federal court was not granting or interpreting a
constitutional right, but a privilege conferred by the law of nations in light of
political decisions made by the United States in its absolute discretion.
This case law interpreting the law of nations in close proximity to the
founding points to the conclusion that the Constitution does not set forth any
rights of a foreign state. Because a foreign state’s immunity from jurisdiction
may be withdrawn by the United States, this means that immunity, personal
jurisdiction, notice, or due process were not rights held by the foreign state.
Instead, they were rights granted, if at all, by the United States or its courts
in applying the law of nations in light of U.S. law to the case at bar in their
discretion.
The Supreme Court’s 1838 decision in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts
points to a similar conclusion.58 In that case, which involved a boundary
dispute between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the Court considered its
original jurisdiction over a suit in equity between two U.S. states. The Court

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 353.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
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considered whether it had jurisdiction.59 In weighing that question, it made
reference to foreign nations. According to the Court,
[t]he founders of our government could not but know, what has ever been,
and is familiar to every statesman and jurist, that all controversies between
nations, are, in this sense, political, and not judicial, as none but the
sovereign can settle them . . . . A sovereign decides by his own will, which
is the supreme law within his own boundary; a court, or judge, decides
according to the law prescribed by the sovereign power, and that law is the
rule for judgment. The submission by the sovereigns, or states, to a court
of law or equity, of a controversy between them, without prescribing any
rule of decision, gives power to decide according to the appropriate law of
the case; which depends on the subject matter, the source and nature of the
claims of the parties, and the law which governs them.60

Put another way, the Constitution may provide a role in vesting and
establishing a federal forum for disputes involving U.S. states or foreign
nations, but it does not provide a rule for decision in such cases, which would
include questions concerning the rights of foreign nations. Such rights would
be derived from other sources, which would include the law of nations.61
Such rights would take account and apply the rules articulated by the United
States as a sovereign power, which could withdraw any rights in its sovereign
discretion. The United States might offer a foreign state rights such as
immunity, but it might not given the case.
It is highly unlikely, therefore, based on this reading of the Constitution,
the law of nations at the time of the founding, and Supreme Court case law
close to the founding that there were certain rights contained in the
Constitution for foreign states. The Constitution itself does not permit such
a picking and choosing of individual or sovereign rights by the federal
government. If there were a right conferred by the Constitution or its
amendments, it can only be waived by the defendant. Thus, because the
federal government had the choice under the law of nations as to what rights
were offered to foreign states, this weighs strongly against the conclusion
that the Constitution established any such rights. It would be very odd indeed
for the Constitution to establish rights for foreign states that could, in the
federal government’s sole and absolute sovereign discretion, be withdrawn
from a foreign state. I am aware of no right in the Constitution or its
amendments that permits the United States in its sole sovereign discretion to
grant or withdraw such a right.
In sum, it is questionable that foreign nations had rights under the
Constitution given that document’s silence on the question, the law of
nations, and Supreme Court case law following the founding. If, as Chief
Justice Marshall observed, a sovereign had the power “to exercise its
territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received

59. Id.
60. Id. at 736–37.
61. See id. at 748.
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obligations of the civilized world,”62 it can hardly be said that a foreign
sovereign has a “right” to anything except as granted by the United States in
its sole discretion as that term is traditionally understood. It is questionable,
therefore, that the original understanding of Article III supports Professor
Wuerth’s claims.
B. The Fifth Amendment
Professor Wuerth also argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protects foreign states because such states, based on her reading
of the history, were protected by process and were understood as persons.63
Here again, I am not sure this is the best reading of the Constitution or its
amendments.
As to text, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “nor
shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”64 Professor Wuerth begins her analysis by considering what
“process” means as it relates to a foreign state.65 The Fifth Amendment is,
however, not implicated unless the word “person” in that amendment
includes a foreign state. There is no definition of the word “person” provided
in the Constitution or its amendments. It seems unlikely that the framers of
the Fifth Amendment would have viewed foreign states as persons given that
foreign sovereigns were treated as completely immune from suit at the time
of the founding.66 Given this absolute immunity, foreign states would not
need to be persons protected by any process under the Fifth Amendment
because at that time they were absolutely immune from all process.
Such a view is suggested by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in The
Schooner Exchange. As he explained,
[t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of
every sovereign, and being capable of conferring extra-territorial power,
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign
rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amendable to
another . . . can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an
express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication, and will be extended to him.67

In light of this statement, one would be hard pressed to argue that a foreign
sovereign entitled to full immunity from suit would require the protection of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.68
62 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
63. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at Part II.B.2.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 676.
66. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind.” Id.
67. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137.
68. See Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing
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The 1828 case of Picquet v. Swan69 confirms this understanding. In that
case, Justice Story riding circuit found jurisdiction to be lacking over a suit
by a French citizen (residing in Paris) against an American citizen (also
residing in Paris).70 The question before the court was whether the
attachment of the property of the nonresident U.S. defendant, even though
permissible and conferring jurisdiction under Massachusetts state law,
provided the federal district court with jurisdiction over the defendant.71
After canvassing the Judiciary Act of 1789 as well as case law, Justice Story
concluded that the Judiciary Act
proceeded upon the supposition, that, independent of some positive
provision to the contrary, no judgment could be rendered in the circuit court
against any person, upon whom process could not be personally served
within the district. This was the natural result of the principles of the
common law in relation to jurisdiction and process.72

Justice Story held that
by the general provisions of the laws of the United States, the circuit courts
could issue no process beyond the limits of their districts. That independent
of positive legislation, the process can only be served upon persons within
the same districts. That the acts of congress, adopting the state process,
adopt the forms and modes of service only so far as the persons are
rightfully within the reach of such process, and did not intend to enlarge the
sphere of jurisdiction of the circuit courts.73

Justice Story concluded that
the right to attach property to compel the appearance of persons can
properly be used only in cases in which such persons are amenable to the
process of the court in personam,—that is, where they are inhabitants, or
found within the United States,—and not where they are aliens or citizens
resident abroad at the commencement of the suit, and have no inhabitancy
here.74

In so holding, Justice Story said nothing about any constitutional limit,
whether found in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or
elsewhere in the Constitution. The process due to a person was not to be
found in the Due Process clause but was to be ascertained through the
common law. As such, Congress could override such law.
As Justice Story explained, Congress could provide for such jurisdiction,
even though it would be contrary to general principles of law: “[i]f congress

State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 692 (1999).
69. 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (Story, J.).
70. Id. at 616.
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id.
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had prescribed such a rule, the court would certainly be bound to follow it,
and proceed upon the law.”75 As Justice Story makes clear,
a subject of England, or France, or Russia, having a controversy with one
of our own citizens, may be summoned from the other end of the globe to
obey our process, and submit to the judgment of our courts. Such an
intention, so repugnant to the general rights and sovereignty of other
nations, ought not to be presumed, unless it is established by irresistible
proof.76

Congress could thus provide for exorbitant jurisdiction and U.S. federal
courts would be bound to exercise such jurisdiction even if contrary to the
law of nations. In considering the question of jurisdiction, therefore, the
limits on a federal court’s jurisdiction were to be found outside of the
Constitution and were subject to Congress’s seemingly limitless ability to
revise the law of jurisdiction.77 What this means is that whatever process
was due to foreign states was not constitutional. Instead, it was subject to
common law or legislation.78
Thus, even assuming that foreign states are “persons” who are entitled to
certain “process,” which is debatable under U.S. case law, the Fifth
Amendment itself cannot be read to convey any rights to a foreign state
because such rights turn on questions of the common law and the law of
nations and not on constitutional law. At the time of the founding, there was
no constitutional constraint on personal jurisdiction. Therefore, a nation
would have been free to exercise whatever jurisdiction it saw fit to exercise
as to a foreign state, with the only constraint on such assertions of exorbitant
jurisdiction being whether another nation would recognize and enforce the
judgment and whether the exercise of jurisdiction gave offense to a foreign
state. In the latter case, the political branches would be left to resolve the
international implications.79
In sum, it is questionable that foreign nations had Fifth Amendment rights
under the Constitution at the time of the founding.
CONCLUSION
Professor Wuerth has advanced a nuanced and novel claim regarding the
constitutional rights of foreign states. While I do not think the Constitution’s
text, original understanding, the law of nations at the founding, or Supreme
Court case law close to the founding supports her argument, I do think that it

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1286–87 (2017).
78. See id.
79. Professor Wuerth goes on to consider the relationship between due process and
separation of powers. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 679. Because she concludes that there is
overlap and duplication between these doctrines as well as Article III, my comments in the
main text call into question whether separation of powers principles are engaged in the case
of foreign states. See id.
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is important to consider the ways in which foreign states are treated by U.S.
federal courts.
As the above discussion details, the United States, whether through the
Executive Branch or Congress, has significant latitude to hale foreign states
before its courts. While Professor Wuerth’s understanding of the text and
purpose of the Constitution points to foreign nations having certain rights,
the better reading of the Constitution in my view, at least at the time of the
founding, points to foreign nations being subject to suit before U.S. federal
courts to the extent the United States provides them with rights. On this
understanding, Professor Wuerth’s claim that the Constitution provides an
answer to the rights of foreign states is questionable. Instead, the amenability
of foreign nations to suit before U.S. federal courts is a question for the
political branches to decide. To the extent the political branches are silent,
U.S. courts, if following the tradition of the founding, would be expected to
consult the law of nations to provide a rule of decision.

